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Although many significant developments have taken place in the
Florida law of trusts and successions, many shortcomings still remain.
Ambiguities, deficiencies and over-aged statutory provisions continue to
confuse and annoy particularly those whose rights are affected. It is
the purpose of this article to analyze some of the recent developments
in the Florida law on trusts and succession in the light of their justification,
effect and shortcomings.
AFFECT OF \VRONCFUL CONDUCT UPON RIGHT OF SURVlVORSHIP
IN ESTATE DY EN-TIRETIES.
In 1951, the Florida Supreme Court was first confronted with the
problem of who succeeds to an estate by the entireties when one spouse
murders the other. This question was raised in the case of Ashwood v.
Patterson' wherein Albert Ashwood murdered his wife and then committed
suicide. No children were born of the marriage, however, each of the
parties had issue by former marriages. Tflie heirs of Mrs. Ashwood
contended that they were entitled to the estate since under the Florida
law2 a murderer is not permitted to inherit from the decedent or to take
any portion of the estate as a devisee or legatee. In answer to this
contention, the Florida Supreme Court declared:3
Upon the death of one spouse, the other does not 'inherit' the
interest of the other in such estate, but merely comes into the full
beneficial enjoyment of such estate, which is said to vest by
operation of law in the surviving spouse.
While the court did acknowledge and subscribe to the equitable
principle that no one shall be permitted to profit by his own wrongdoing,
it was also concerned with the modern principles opposed to forfeiture of
estates by the commission of a felony. After examining the holdings of
other jurisdictions,4 the court subscribed to the Missouri view which
*Professor, University of Miami School of Law. Member of the Florida Bar.
1. 49 So.2d 848 (1951).
2. FLA. SrAT. § 731.31 (19511.
3. 49 So.2d 848, 849 (Fla. 1951).
4. Sherman v. Weber, 113 N.J. Eq. 451, 167 Aft. 517 (1933) (murdering
husband declared a constructive trustee of the value of the mnrdered wife's ne income
during her life expectancy for benefit of wife's heirs); Van Alstyne v. Tuffy, 103 Misc.
455, 169 N.Y. Supp. 173 (Sup. Ct. 1918) (although murdered wife predeceased
murdering husband, her heirs succeeded to the entire estate held by the entireties);
Bryan v. Bryant, 193 N.C. 372, 137 S. E. 188 (1927) (murdering husband entitled
to life estate and upon his death, entire estafe to heirs of muTdered wife).
5. Barnett v. Coney, 224 Mo. App. 913, 27 S.W.2d 757 (1930).
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destroys the fiction of unity of estates and creates a tenancy in common
thereby permitting one half of the estate to go to the heirs of the
murdering spouse and one half to the heirs of the murdered spouse. In
this respect, the Florida Supreme Court regards the murder of one spouse
by the other with the same affect as divorce. In the language of the court:"
• . where the husband by his wilful, felonious act dissolves the
marital relationship, and as a consequence there is a severance
of the estate by the entirety, such property may well be treated as
held by tenants in common.
ADOPTION
Although the institution of adoption was unknown at the common
law, it is today very generally recognized and jealously protected by virtue
of the humanitarian concept of providing a home for the homeless and
an heir for the childless. The extent of this motivating concept is readily
discernible from the extent of inheritance conferred upon an adopted
child by legislative act. The majority of states have statutes permitting
the adoptee to inherit from the adopter and conversely, the adopter from
the adoptee. Such provisions are apparently justified on the ground that
by virtue of adoption, the parent-child relationship is created. This
rationale is further fortified by the fact that provision is generally made
precluding an adopted child from sharing in the estate of his natural
parents.
In this respect, somewhat of an anomaly is created by the prevailing
view preventing an adopted child from inheriting "through" his adopting
parents, i.e., from the ancestors of his adopting parents. The reason
generally subscribed as justification for such a holding was aptly quoted
in the case of In re Hewett's Estate7
The ancestors of the adopter are presumed to know their relatives
by blood, and to have them in mind in the distribution of their
estates, either by will or descent, but they cannot be expected to
keep informed as to adoption proceedings in the probate courts
of the counties of this state; and to allow an adopted child to
inherit from the ancestors of the adoptee would often put property
into the hands of unheard of adopted children, contrary to the
wishes and expectations of such ancestors.
The Florida Statute conferring the right of inheritance by adopted
children is similar to that in the majority of jurisdictions insofar as the
adoptee has the right to inherit from the adopter, and the adopter inherits
from the adopted child. However, in other respects, the Florida position
6. 49 So.2d 848, 850 (Fla. 1951).
7. 13 So.2d 904, 907 (Fla. 1943).
8. Fi. STAT. § 731.30 (1951).
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shows a greater partiality toward the adopted child and is inclined toward
the classification of advanced legislation. In addition to inheriting from
his adopting parents, the adoptee inherits from his natural parents. Any
effort to justify such a provision would be purely conjectural since the
basis for such a holding has not been evinced either judicially or legislatively.
If the natural parent-child relationship is severed by virtue of adoption
by another, the child would be deprived of any right of inheritance
from the natural parents, since the parties would then be regarded as
strangers. If, on the other hand, the statement "once of blood, always
of blood" is applied, the adopted child and natural parents would have
the right to inherit from one another which is not the case. Of course,
the provision could always be justified on the basis of the deeply entrenched
public policy favoring the institution of adoption and the desire to confer
greater benefits upon the child. Is any greater justification required?
The most advanced type of legislation regards the adopted child as
a natural child of his adopter for all purposes including inheritance
thereby permitting the adoptee to inherit "through" his adopting parents.
It appears that such legislation has been long overdue particularly, since
in all other respects, emphasis is continually placed upon the removal of
any distinctions existing between adopted and natural child.
In 1953, the Florida legislature took an important step forward by
enacting legislation0 which provides:
The adopted child shall be regarded as the natural brother or
sister of the natural children and other adopted children of the
adopting parents for the purpose of inheritance for or by them.
Although such legislation serves to grant to the adopted child, for
purposes of inheritance, the status of natural brother or sister to other
children of the adopting parents, it falls short, from the most desirable
point, of establishing an adopted child as a natural child for all purposes,
including inheritance. The courts are powerless-it is up to the legislature
to complete the story to its logical conclusion.
DOWER
At the common law, a surviving widow was granted a .lower right
in her husband's estate consisting of a life estate in one third of the lands
which her husband owned during coverture.' 0 This common law concept
of dower has been generally retained, however, greatly modified in order
to afford a surviving widow greater assurance against destitution.
In Florida dower now consists of a one third part in fee simple
of the lands which the husband owned during coverture and to which
9. Ibid.
10. ATKINSON, WILLS, 104 (2d ed. 1953).
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the wife did not relinquish her dower, plus one third absolute interest
in the personalty the husband owned at the time of his death. By
virtue of amendment enacted in 1951, this dower right is exempt from
the debts and obligations of the husband, however, it remains ratably
liable for the payment of inheritance taxes. Since dower was originally
designed to afford a surviving widow a degree of protection from
destitution, its creation and continuance is conditioned upon the
husband-wife relationship. Thus it is generally held that the right of
dower stands or falls as a result of a decree which denies or grants a
divorce.' 2
While a husband cannot deprive his surviving widow of dower by
testamentary disposition, he can require her to elect dower or a provision
made iii her favor by express language to that effect.'3 In fact, under
Florida law and contrary to the common law, a provision in favor of a
surviving widow is presumed to be in lieu of dower, thereby requiring
an election. 4
In general, the right of election is personal unto the surviving wife,
however, since 1951 the right of election has been extended to the guardian
of an incompetent widow and to the beneficiaries of the widow's estate
when she dies prior to exercising her election. In each case where the
election is exercised by one other than the widow, it is subject to the
approval of the County judge motivated by the best interest of those
entitled to share. Insofar as the Florida position permits the election
to be exercised by the beneficiaries of the widow upon her death, a
radical departure from the prevailing view has been taken without any
realistic justification. If dower was originally founded on the concept of
protecting a widow from destitution, why should it be permitted to inure
to the benefit of possible strangers under any circumstances? While
the discretion accorded the County Judge will undoubtedly prevent the
perpretration of many inequities, it cannot, consistent with the legislative
intent, prevent some inequities made possible by the enactment.
Time for election.-Whether the right of election is exercised by the
surviving widow, her guardian or beneficiaries, it must be made within
nine (9) months from the first publication of notice to creditors."n Although
this time limit is imposed in the public interest by expediting the
administration of estates, it can create hardships insofar as the surviving
widow is concerned. For example, suppose the will of a husband is
contested and the contest extends beyond the nine month period from
11, FLA. STAT, § 731.34 (1951).
12. Pawley v. Pawey, 46 So,2d 464 (Fla.), rehearing denied, 47 So.2d 546 (Fla.),
340 U.S. 866 (1950); Bowler v. Bowler, 159 Fla. 447, 31 So.2d 751 (1947).
13. In re McMillan's Estate, 158 Fla. 898, 30 So.2d 534 (1947).
14. Ibid.
15. Fi. STAT. § 731.35 (1951); Exchange Nat'l Bank of Winter Haven v. Smith,
148 Fla. 473, 4 So,2d 675 (1941).
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the time of first publication of notice to creditors. If the surviving
widow exercises her right of election before the validity of the will
is determined, she may be prejudiced by the final adjudication. Or if
she waits until after the final determination of the will's validity, the
period within which her election was to have been made will have expired.
In such a case, she will be deemed to have waived her right to elect.
In order to avoid these inequities, a provision should be made extending
the time for a widow to exercise her right of election in the case of a will
contest and where a will is discovered after intestate administration has
been commenced. Delay in the administration process will not be occasioned
by such extension of time since the delay is attributed to the contest of
the will's validity or the added time necessary upon discovery of a will
after intestate proceedings have commenced.
OBJECTIONS TO CLAIMS FILED AGAINST AN Es'rA'E
A personal representative or other interested party objecting to a
claim filed against an estate is, by virtue of 1953 Amendment, obligated
to serve a copy of such objection by registered mail or personal service
on the creditor to whose claim the objection is made.16  This mandatory
requirement appears to have created an ambiguity in the statute relating
to the time within which a creditor must bring an appropriate suit,
action or proceeding in order to establish his claim to which an objection
had been filed.
Prior to 1953, the period within which such prQceeding had to be
brought was twelve calendar months from the date of first publication
of notice to creditors. However, since that date the period for bringing
suit is left in doubt.
One provision of the pertinent statute provides:
The claimant shall have twelve calendar months from the first
publication of notice to creditors in which to bring appropriate
suit, action or proceeding upon such claim.
An additional provision in the same statute provides:
In such event, (the filing of objection to claim) the claimant shall
be limited to two calendar months from the date of such service
within which to bring appropriate suit, action or proceeding upon
such claim. (Parenthesis added).
The query is immediately raised-does the creditor have twelve calendar
months in which to institute proceedings for the enforcement of his
claim? If the answer is in the affirmative, then of what effect is the
provision requiring the creditor to institute proceedings within two calendar
16, FIA. STAT. § 733.18(2) (1951).
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months from the date of service of objections? It is a well recognized
rule of statutory construction, that every word contained in a statute is
designed to accomplish a particular purpose. Consequently, the provision
granting the creditor twelve calendar months from date of first publication
of notice to creditors in which to institute proceedings is assumed to be
included for a particular purpose. Further, the provision requiring the
creditor to file a suit for enforcement of his claim within two calendar
months from service of objection, must also be regarded as included for a
particular purpose. Needless to say, both provisions while relating to the
same right, are inconsistent. If the provision relating to the service of
objection upon the creditor were left discretionary with the objector, as
was the case prior to 1953, there would be no problem. In such event
the literal meaning of the statute would incline one to believe that if
objections were served upon the creditor by registered mail or personal
service, then, and in that event, the creditor would have two months
from date of such service in which to institute the proceedings. However,
if the personal representative or other interested party did not serve such
objections upon the creditor, the creditor would then have twelve months
from the date of first publication of notice to creditors in which to
institute his proceedings.
This result may have been intended by the legislature. However, it
appears that by changing a single word in the statute from "may" to
"shall" the legislature has created an ambiguous situation that must be
clarified either by decision or a statutory amendment.
LIMITATION OF CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE
Non-claim statutes lose their efficacy as an aid in expediting the
settlement of estates unless they are assisted by a statutory limitation for
the satisfaction of claims which have been filed. On many occasions claims
are filed against the state of a decedent within the time limitation provided
by the non-claim statute and these claims remain unsatisfied for one reason
or another, although no objections have been filed against them. The
1953 legislature recognized the problem by enacting a provisionl 7 which
bars the enforcement of all claims which have been properly filed and
to which no objections have been filed if no proceedings are commenced
within three years from the date of their filing.
Expressly excepted from the operation of this provision are duly
recorded mortgages or liens on personal property held by any person in
possession. This statute expressly provides for duly recorded mortgages
as an exception from its operation. The query is immediately raised,
what about valid but unrecorded mortgages? If the statute is to be
interpreted literally, it is reasonable to assume that Unrecorded mortgages
17. FLA. STAT. § 733.18 (1953).
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although valid in all respects would not be included as an exception under
the statute, and consequently would be barred after three years from
the date of filing of the claim. If the purpose of recording a mortgage
is merely to give bona fide purchasers for value notice and to determine
the priority of creditors, why should the act of recordation be given
such an effect? Certainly the filing of an unrecorded mortgage claim
has the effect of giving to the personal representative notice of the
existence of the claim and should suffice to preserve the mortgage as a
lien upon the property upon which it is imposed.
REVOCATION OF WILL BY DIVORCE
It is generally agreed and held that in the absence of statutes to the
contrary, divorce in and of itself is insufficient to revoke any provision
contained in the will in favor of the divorced spouse. However, it is
equally agreed that divorce plus a property settlement do have the effect
of revoking a provision in the will in favor of the divorced spouse.
Prior to 1951, and by virtue of the Supreme Court's decision Florida
refused to recognize the majority holding that divorce plus property
settlement constituted a revocation of a provision in the will in favor
of a divorced spouse.' 8 In arriving at this conclusion, the Florida Supreme
Court subscribed to the view announced in an Illinois case: 19
It is only fair to assume that if the legislature had intended that a
divorce should effect a revocation of a will it would have so
expressly provided. The action of the legislature, in expressly
providing the means for effecting a revocation of a will precludes
the application of the doctrine of implied revocation in ease
of divorce.20
In 1951 the Florida view was changed from one extreme to the
other by virtue of legislative act 2' which now provides, that a divorce
in and of itself constitutes a revocation of a provision contained in a
will in favor of the divorced spouse.
QUALIFICATION AND SUPERVISION OF TESTAMENTARY TRUSTEES
In 1951, the Florida legislature enacted a provision which broadly
undertakes to grant to the circuit courts authority to supervise the acts of
testamentary trustees as a cautionary and preventative measure. By its
terms, a testamentary trustee is required to file a petition in the circuit court
of the county in which either he or the deceased is domiciled for the
purpose of establishing his qualifications before receiving the trust res.-'
18. Davis v. Davis, 57 So.2d 8 (Fla. 1952); Ireland v. Terwilligcr, 54 So.2d 52
(Fla. 1951),
19. Gartin v. Gartin, 371 Ill. 418, 21 N.E.2d 289, 290 (1939).
20. Ireland v. Terwilliger, 54 So.2d 52, 53 (Fla. 1951).
21. FI.A. STAT. § 732.261 (1951).
22. FLA. STAT. § 737.02 (1951).
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If the trustee fails or refuses to file such petition within 60 days after
notification from the executor that he is ready to make distribution of the
trust res, a similar petition may be filed by any one of several beneficiaries
or the executory 3
The effect of this provision is commendably threefold: first, the
beneficiary is more adequately apprised of the nature and extent of the
trust res; second, the circuit court is granted the opportunity to examine
the capabilities and moral qualifications of the testamentary trustee before
he receives the trust corpus; third, the circuit court is granted supervisory
jurisdiction over the testamentary trustee.
It thus appears that from the standpoint of regulation and supervision,
a testamenary trustee is treated similar to an executor and administrator.
lie is now required to qualify and file annual returns in order to apprise
the court of his activities performed for the benefit of others. At long last
the beneficiaries under a testamentary trust have the right to feel reasonably
secured in the knowledge that their interests are being protected by the
watchful eye of the judiciary.
23. FLA. SrAT. § 737.04 (1951).
